Gadaffi’s Touareg Mercenaries 20/03/2011
After weeks of deliberation, the UN security council has finally adopted a resolution authorising all means necessary to protect the Libyan people. But against whom exactly is the coalition fighting? From the start of the counter-offensive by the West’s favourite oil-supplying dictator, news reports have been circulating about ‘ferocious Touareg mercenaries’ hired by the colonel to further his cause. Who are these people? And more importantly: have they in fact supported Gaddafi? TEXT: Niels Goet IMAGE: Garrondo When I say ‘Touareg’ your first thought might be of the most polluting car to hit the roads in quite some time. In the context of the revolution in Libya however, it might be more fitting to revert to its original meaning rather than talk about V6 or V8 engines. In fact, the Touareg are a population of some one and a half million people. Originally a nomadic people, many have now settled in major cities on the peripheries of the Sahara desert. Currently, they are located in five countries on the African continent. In the 1990s, struggles against the cultural assimilation that was forced upon them were triggered. Especially in Mali and Nigeria, the Touareg have strongly opposed government and fought for political self-determination. The presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has not exactly made things better for the Touareg: continuous kidnappings have not helped keep the region attractive for tourists and investments. With the lovely add-on of drought and underdevelopment, an offer of weapons and dollars by Gaddafi do become quite attractive. But where do the Touareg come into play in Gaddafi’s schemes? 800 young Touareg have been contracted by Gaddafi since the start of the Libyan uprising. Originally from Mali and Niger, they seem to have fled the poverty and soaring unemployment in the southern Sahara. Gaddafi has been courting the Touareg for quite a long time. In the 1980s, he invited them to join his Islamic Legion, subsequently dispatching them in regional wars. The colonel never really helped this people advance their cause. Still, many Touareg fear his fall from power: he has been the only leader ever to furnish them with weapons and money. Moreover, the Touareg are not exactly popular in Libya either: it is because of Gadaffi that they were allowed to travel the country freely in the first place. A change of power might have severe repercussions for their position. Additionally, we should not underestimate the consequences of an exodus of many Touareg into their homelands if Libya collapses. These people will probably be well-armed and impoverished. Seeing as the peace between the Touareg and the Malian government is already under strain, an influx of armed mercenaries might just not be desirable. However, as with everything Gaddafi does, his strategies are far from clear. His attitude towards the Touareg is equally ambiguous. Internationally, he has often claimed a position as their ‘protector’, fitting them into his grand scheme of creating a ‘Sahara without borders’. Nationally, he has often rejected them as ‘poisoning Arab culture’. All in all, it seems that Gadaffi is a snappy tactician and he will make use of any resource to cling on to power. His Touareg mercenaries are but one of the many tools to reach this ambition. CommentsLeave a Reply |

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